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Note
RESTRICTIONS ON PRISONERS’ RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL




Not so long ago, the United States Supreme Court described one
American prison as “a dark and evil world”1 in which inmates were
routinely raped, stabbed, shot, and tortured.2 Many prisoners were
knowingly exposed to communicable diseases3 and were fed “fewer
than 1,000 calories a day; their meals consisted primarily of four-inch
squares of ‘grue,’ a substance created by mashing meat, potatoes,
oleo, syrup, vegetables, eggs, and seasoning into a paste and baking
the mixture in a pan.”4
1. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970)).
2. See id. at 681-82 nn.3-6.
3. See id. at 682-83 (discussing hepatitis and venereal diseases specifically). These condi-
tions were imposed on prisoners in “punitive isolation.” Id. at 682. Such inmates remained in
isolation “indefinitely.” Id. As many as 11 inmates were crowded into an 8 by 10 foot cell with-
out windows or furniture. See id.
4. Id. at 683 (footnote omitted). Hutto was not an anomaly and is not an anachronism.
The Supreme Court recently heard Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992), which involved the
following facts:
[P]etitioner Keith Hudson was an inmate at the state penitentiary in Angola, Louisi-
ana. Respondents Jack McMillian, Marvin Woods, and Arthur Mezo served as cor-
rections security officers at the Angola facility. [One morning] McMillian . . . placed
Hudson in handcuffs and shackles, took the prisoner out of his cell, and walked him
toward the penitentiary’s “administrative lockdown” area. Hudson testified that, on
the way there, McMillian punched Hudson in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach
while Woods held the inmate in place and kicked and punched him from behind. He
further testified that Mezo, the supervisor on duty, watched the beating but merely
told the officers “not to have too much fun.”
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Prison can be both dull and brutal. Inmates are stripped of free-
dom, social ties, and material possessions. They have time to pray
and much to pray for, and may therefore cling fiercely to their spiri-
tuality.5 Indeed, the importance of religion to some prisoners may be
hard for those of us in the “free world” to grasp. In the words of one
former prisoner: “The richest spiritual experiences I have known
have not been in vaulted cathedrals surrounded by stained-glass win-
dows but in the filthiest prison cells.”6
Despite the central place religion occupies in many prisoners’
lives, and despite the fact that the rehabilitative effects of religion
may be significant,7 inmates’ religious freedoms are not well pro-
tected. The political branches have failed to guarantee such liberty,
and the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment applies
only weakly in the prison setting.8 Consequently, in this Note, I out-
line a new approach to the issue. I argue that the Eighth Amend-
ment—which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment9—should be
held to prohibit many currently accepted restrictions on religious ex-
ercise in prisons.
In Part I, I argue that protecting the religious freedom of prison-
ers is important, both to prisoners themselves and to society more
broadly. Despite its importance, the religious freedom of prisoners is
not currently well protected, as I detail in Part II. In Part III, the core
of this Note, I argue that the Eighth Amendment should be held to
prohibit some deprivations of religious freedom. This argument is
based primarily on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding
“conditions of confinement,” though other facets of Eighth Amend-
ment doctrine also come into play. Then, in Part IV, I consider and
reject two objections that might be made to the argument advanced
in Part III. I discuss the theoretical and practical limitations of my
proposal in the Conclusion.
Id. at 4; see also ACLU, Alabama Prison “Hitching Posts” Ruled Unconstitutional (last modi-
fied Feb. 10, 1997) <http://www.aclu.org/news/w021097c.html> (detailing repugnant discipli-
nary practices in Alabama prisons).
5. See HENRY G. COVERT, MINISTRY TO THE INCARCERATED 117 (1995) (noting that
“[p]rison life leads inmates to look to the spiritual realm”).
6. CHARLES W. COLSON, LIFE SENTENCE 151 (1979).
7. See infra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
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I. THE IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTING THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OF
PRISONERS
The value of religious liberty is recognized by both philoso-
phers10 and politicians.11 It is a notion that has been deeply and pro-
foundly accepted by Americans.12 In the words of our Supreme Court,
“only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise
served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of re-
ligion.”13 It is, then, a tenet of American society that free exercise
should be strongly protected, and the issue of prisoners’ religious
freedom should be examined through this lens.
Viewed through any lens, however, there are powerful reasons
for protecting inmates’ religious liberty. For example, religion may
have significant rehabilitative effects. Early American prison officials
certainly believed this,14 and some contemporary data support the
proposition.15 Many religious prisoners—perhaps unsurprisingly—
10. For example, John Rawls, easily the most influential contemporary political philoso-
pher, avers: “The question of equal liberty of conscience [which he defines to include religious
freedom] is settled. It is one of the fixed points of our considered judgments of justice.” JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 206 (1971).
11. See infra notes 100-14 and accompanying text (discussing the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act (RFRA), which embodies Congress’s devotion to the ideal of religious freedom).
Religious freedom is also one of the rights identified in the United Nations Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 18, at 71, 74, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
12. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1117-19 (1990) (discussing the early American history of protecting free
exercise).
13. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (terming religious freedom “essential” in a democratic system). But cf.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990) (purporting to harmonize with Yoder
and its progeny but, in fact, severely limiting the rights of religious people to be exempted from
laws which conflict with their religious beliefs).
14. See, e.g., JOHN L. COWART, THE PRISON MINISTER’S HANDBOOK 33-34 (1996) (noting
that most early American prisons provided chaplains and used religion as therapy for criminal-
ity).
15. See generally Joe Loconte, Jailhouse Rock of Ages, POL’Y REV., July-Aug. 1997, at 12,
12 (discussing domestic and international evidence that religion reduces recidivism); Andrew
Skotnicki, Religion and Rehabilitation, 15 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 34, 40-41 (1996) (citing theories
that religious people commit fewer crimes); Center for Social Research, Religion and Prisons:
Do Volunteer Religious Programs Reduce Recidivism? (1997) (unpublished study, on file with
author) (stating that inmates who do not participate in prison religious programs are four times
more likely to be re-arrested than otherwise similar inmates who participate extensively in such
programs).
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also adhere to this view.16 To the extent that limitations on religious
freedom reduce inmates’ ability to practice their religions, such re-
strictions may carry increased recidivism as an attendant social cost.
The effect of religion on recidivism is essentially a specific appli-
cation of a broader principle: religion can be a positive force in pris-
oners’ lives. One inmate who found meaning and direction in religion
said, “I don’t look at prison as prison but as a monastery to do God’s
work.”17 Religious services can also provide inmates the opportunity
to socialize with others in a constructive and cooperative way—an
opportunity that is not common in prison.18 Finally, religion can pro-
vide prisoners with the hope of personal change, and of a future in
the free world.19 It is neither in the interest of inmates nor in the in-
terest of society as a whole to force prisoners to go without the hu-
manizing benefits that religion can provide.20
A critic might contend that the issue is simple—the Eighth
Amendment either does, or does not, protect inmates’ free exercise;
the question of whether such protection is “important” is politically
interesting but constitutionally irrelevant. But the discussion pre-
sented in this Part connects in two ways with the constitutional argu-
ment that follows. First, I argue in Part III that some restrictions on
inmates’ religious freedoms are inconsistent with contemporary stan-
dards of decency, and are thus forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.
That argument is made more complete by the foregoing sketch of the
reasons that have led many people to conclude that such restrictions
on free exercise are inappropriate.21 Second, even if the argument I
present in Part III is a sound one, it will make no difference unless
lawyers are convinced that prisoners’ freedoms are worth worrying
about, and litigating. Judges must also be convinced that prisoners
matter, and that their claims should be handled thoughtfully and se-
riously. Hopefully, the discussion in this Part will help foster such
convictions.
16. See, e.g., HARRY R. DAMMER, PIETY IN PRISON 148 (1992) (noting that some inmates
believe that religion “helps you change your life” and “gives you a straight path”).
17. Id. at 149.
18. See id. at 161-64.
19. See id. at 148.
20. Of course, some prisoners may merely pretend to be religious, for a variety of reasons.
See id. at 150-90, 240-41 (noting reasons such as group identity, social opportunity, and greater
access to resources). The existence of these “fronters” should not be allowed to eviscerate the
religious freedom of the authentically religious.
21. For example, most congressmen so concluded, as reflected in their passage of RFRA.
See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
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II. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OF PRISONERS IS POORLY
PROTECTED
Unfortunately, prisoners’ religious freedom is poorly protected.
Neither the political branches nor the courts have provided a robust
guarantee of this important liberty.
Federal prisons are managed directly by the executive branch.22
The Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) proclaims that prisoners
shall have “reasonable and equitable opportunities to pursue relig-
ious beliefs and practices.”23 There is, however, a catch: religious ex-
ercise may be restrained out of concern for safety, security, or “good
order,”24 or because of scheduling problems, or a limited budget, or
because a given inmate has not officially stated his religious prefer-
ence, or because a chaplain has not approved an inmate for participa-
tion in a religious activity.25 The exceptions eviscerate the rule. In-
deed, the relevant portion of the C.F.R. has merited citation in only
five federal cases.26 In each of the five, the prisoner lost.27
Congress has also failed to provide a substantial guarantee of re-
ligious freedom to prisoners. It attempted to do so by passing the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),28 which pro-
hibited any limitation on inmates’ religious freedom that could not
pass strict scrutiny.29 However, the Supreme Court held RFRA un-
22. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 500-72 (1998) (laying out the regulations governing the Bureau of
Prisons).
23. 28 C.F.R. § 548.10.
24. Id. Whether such concerns justify a restriction on free exercise is a discretionary deci-
sion to be made by the warden. See id.
25. See 28 C.F.R. § 548. Not all of these limitations apply to every type of religious exer-
cise. For example, chaplains apparently must pre-approve inmates’ written applications for re-
ligious diets, see 28 C.F.R. § 548.20, while other types of religious observance do not require
such an application.
26. The five cases are: O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); Johnson v.
United States Bureau of Prisons, No. 93-35198, 1993 WL 524120 (9th Cir. Dec. 15, 1993);
Davidson v. Chestnut, No. 96 CIV. 1228 (LMM), 1998 WL 436527 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1998);
Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. 1429 (W.D. Wis. 1995); and Grant v. Matthews, No. 89-3194-R,
1992 WL 160926 (D. Kan. June 12, 1992).
27. See O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 353; Johnson, 1993 WL 524120, at *2; Davidson, 1998 WL
436527, at *7; Sasnett, 908 F. Supp. at 1450; Grant, 1992 WL 160926, at *4.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
29. See id. § 2000bb-1 (forbidding substantial burdens on free exercise except those which
are the “least restrictive means” of furthering a “compelling governmental interest”); see also,
e.g., Mack v. O’Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1178-81 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying RFRA’s strict scrutiny to
prisoners’ religious freedom claims); infra notes 100-09 and accompanying text (discussing
RFRA’s applicability to prisoners). The practical effect of RFRA was to expand, significantly,
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constitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores.30 Perhaps chastened by
Boerne, Congress has failed to pass any new legislation to protect the
religious freedom of prisoners.31
To make matters worse, state governments have generally de-
clined to guarantee greater liberty to their inmates than the federal
government has provided to theirs.32 Absent legislative action, state
correctional employees—who are infamously indifferent to the needs
of religious prisoners33—are unlikely to allow more than minimal re-
ligious exercise.34 One state’s secretary of corrections made his atti-
tude plain, by threatening to eliminate all religious programs in the
state’s prisons, and by remarking that “a man can have a relationship
with God alone in his cell.”35
Thus, the federal and state governments’ policy choices have left
the task of protecting the religious liberty of prisoners to the courts.
religious services in many penal institutions. See JAMES A. BECKFORD & SOPHIE GILLIAT,
RELIGION IN PRISON 174-76 (1998).
RFRA was not primarily targeted at prisoners, of course; it was intended to legisla-
tively reverse the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1). The literature on Smith and RFRA is vast; two pieces of
note are Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 883 (1994) and McConnell, supra note 12.
30. 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997).
31. But see infra notes 115-19 and accompanying text (discussing pending legislation).
32. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Religious Leaders Fear Implications of Recent Court Rul-
ing, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 19, 1997, at 1G (noting that only eight states provide robust
protection for religious freedom); see also, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4027, 5009 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1998) (requiring only that inmates have “reasonable” opportunities to practice their re-
ligions). What the states do about religious exercise may ultimately be more important than
what the federal government does, as the vast majority of prisoners are in state facilities. See
Department of Justice Press Release (visited Aug. 27, 1998)
<http://ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/pjim97.pr> (noting that 90% of America’s prisoners are in
state prisons). In the wake of Boerne, some states are considering, or have considered, passing
their own statutory protections for religious freedom. Whether prisons ought to be covered by
such legislation is often a contentious point. See, e.g., Dan Bernstein, Assembly Passes Religious
Rights Bill, FRESNO BEE, Aug. 22, 1998, at A14 (discussing California legislation); Steve
Kloehn, Edgar Amends Law on Religious Freedom, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 15, 1998, at 6 (discussing
Illinois legislation).
33. See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text (discussing state prison directors’ efforts
to have prisoners excluded from the effects of RFRA).
34. Of course, the states must allow religious exercise that is constitutionally mandated
under either the First or the Eighth Amendment. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822
(1974) (applying the First Amendment to state prisoners); Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,
463 (1947) (holding that the Eighth Amendment applies to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
35. Morning Edition: Effects of RFRA Nix (National Public Radio broadcast, July 7, 1997)
(quoting an unnamed secretary of corrections).
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But the courts have not been receptive to prisoners’ free exercise
claims. The seminal Supreme Court decisions in this area are Turner
v. Safley36 and O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz.37
Turner was a class action challenge to two prison regulations.38
The first challenged regulation severely restricted inmates’ right to
correspond with other inmates, while the second barred inmates from
marrying without the prison superintendent’s permission.39 The Court
sustained the first regulation and struck down the second.40 However,
the real import of the case was not its narrow holding, but the stan-
dard that the Court applied to the inmates’ constitutional claims. The
Court held that “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ con-
stitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests.”41
O’Lone was decided eight days later. The O’Lone plaintiffs were
Muslim inmates who, by the operation of prison work regulations,
were prohibited from attending Jumu’ah, a Muslim worship service
held on Friday afternoons.42 They claimed that this state of affairs
violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.43 The
Court, reversing an en banc federal court of appeals decision, denied
relief.44 The Court quoted extensively from the Turner opinion, and
applied the “rational relation to legitimate penological interests”
test.45
Turner and O’Lone settled a lively debate over the appropriate
level of scrutiny to be applied to inmates’ First Amendment claims.
While Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Turner treated the is-
sue as if the answer were clear from precedent,46 both the district
court that first heard the case and the Eighth Circuit, which reviewed
36. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
37. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
38. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 81.
39. See id. at 81-82.
40. See id. at 91.
41. Id. at 89.
42. See O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 344-45.
43. See id. at 347.
44. See id. at 345, 347-48.
45. See id. at 349-53.
46. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-89 (reviewing precedents and concluding that they require
use of the “rational relation to legitimate penological interests” test).
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it, applied strict scrutiny to the challenged regulations.47 And in
O’Lone, the Third Circuit had used a form of intermediate scrutiny.48
The highly deferential standard of review mandated by Turner
and O’Lone has been used to “mechanically . . . uphold a variety of
restrictions on prisoners’ free exercise rights.”49 Among the claims
that have been denied under the Turner test are Jewish inmates’ re-
quests for a kosher diet,50 or at least one without pork;51 Roman
Catholics’ requests to keep a rosary or scapular in their cells;52 and
Native American inmates’ requests to be allowed to wear their hair
long and to attend the sweat lodge purification ceremony that their
religion requires.53
For religious inmates, then, the current picture is bleak. Neither
the political branches nor the judiciary, at any level of government,
currently offers a strong guarantee of religious liberty. The time may
be ripe for a new approach.
III. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT MAY PROTECT THE RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM OF PRISONERS
An inmate who has been denied the opportunity to practice his
religion is not likely to win a First Amendment suit, and is equally
unlikely to find solace in the policies of the political branches of his
federal and state governments. Perhaps, then, he should consider
bringing an Eighth Amendment suit. Current Supreme Court juris-
47. See id. at 83 (discussing the opinions of the lower courts); Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d
1307, 1310-11 (8th Cir. 1985) (requiring strict scrutiny); Safley v. Turner, 586 F. Supp. 589, 595
(W.D. Mo. 1984) (requiring that the state show an important governmental interest and narrow
tailoring, per Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)).
48. See O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 347-48 (discussing the opinions of the lower courts); Shabazz
v. O’Lone, 782 F.2d 416, 420 (3d Cir. 1986) (requiring an inquiry into the tailoring of regula-
tions and the viability of alternative, less restrictive measures). But cf. Shabazz v. O’Lone, 595
F. Supp. 928, 934 (D.N.J. 1984) (applying rational basis scrutiny).
49. Geoffrey S. Frankel, Note, Untangling First Amendment Values: The Prisoners’ Di-
lemma, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1614, 1630 (1991). For a compilation of cases proving this
point, see id. at 1630-34, 1641-42.
50. See, e.g., Ben-Avraham v. Moses, No. 92-35604, 1993 WL 269611, at *3 (9th Cir. July
19, 1993). But see Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1997) (granting such a
request, but not expressly overruling Ben-Avraham).
51. See, e.g., Burns v. Long, Nos. 92-7062, 92-7063, 1994 WL 709329, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Nov.
29, 1994) (per curiam).
52. See, e.g., Friend v. Kolodzieczak, 923 F.2d 126, 128 (9th Cir. 1991).
53. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1551 (8th Cir. 1996). Many Native Ameri-
cans see their hair as a gift of the Creator, and cut it only when a close friend or family member
dies. See id. at 1547-48.
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prudence regarding conditions of confinement would support an ar-
gument that some religious deprivations are cruel and unusual pun-
ishments.
A. Background
The original meaning of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment has been the subject of substantial ju-
dicial54 and academic55 discussion. A rough consensus has emerged:
most now agree that the Amendment was meant only to bar judges
from imposing barbarous types of punishments (like drawing and
quartering) as part of a defendant’s sentence.56
But the Amendment has been read, in modern times, to prohibit
much more. For example, it now prohibits the imposition of a pun-
ishment which is of an acceptable type but which—given the crime for
which it is imposed—is excessive in degree.57 And, more importantly
for the purposes of this Note, it prohibits some nonjudicial behavior.
Specifically, the Amendment has been held to prohibit prison ad-
ministrators from confining prisoners in certain inhumane condi-
tions.58
54. See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38-40 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(analyzing the original meaning of the Amendment and arguing against its applicability to con-
ditions of confinement cases); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1992) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting) (same); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-73 (1976) (plurality opinion) (surveying
the Amendment’s origins and its later judicial interpretations); Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 368-73 (1910) (discussing the history of the Amendment and its English antecedents).
Interestingly, Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas’s dissents in Hudson and Helling, but was
the author of the opinion of the Court in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991), where he applied
the Eighth Amendment to a conditions of confinement case. See id. at 302.
55. Especially prominent is Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969). See also, e.g., Jeffrey D. Buk-
owski, Comment, The Eighth Amendment and Original Intent: Applying the Prohibition Against
Cruel and Unusual Punishments to Prison Deprivation Cases Is Not Beyond the Bounds of His-
tory and Precedent, 99 DICK. L. REV. 419 (1995) (arguing that although the Eighth Amend-
ment was not originally understood to protect prisoners from conditions of confinement, the
Supreme Court has properly concluded that confinement is itself a form of punishment subject
to the Eighth Amendment).
56. See Granucci, supra note 55. At the Supreme Court level, the history of the Eighth
Amendment has been most fully explored in the opinions of Justice Thomas, who is part of the
consensus. See supra note 54; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242-45 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 258-64 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 316-22 (Marshall, J.,
concurring); id. at 376-79 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
57. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (holding that the death penalty “is an
excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life”).
58. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101-08 (1976) (applying, for the first time, the
Eighth Amendment to a conditions of confinement case). Paradigmatic examples of forbidden
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The history of the Court’s “conditions of confinement” jurispru-
dence has been ably traced elsewhere,59 but a brief recap may be use-
ful here. The Court’s first conditions case was Estelle v. Gamble.60 In
Estelle, a Texas prisoner argued that he had been subjected to cruel
and unusual punishment because he had received deficient medical
treatment from prison doctors after a work-related injury.61 The
Court concluded that because “infliction of . . . unnecessary suffering
is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency . . . [,] delib-
erate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes
the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the
Eighth Amendment.”62 While acknowledging that the Framers would
not likely have endorsed such an interpretation of the Amendment,63
the Court supported its holding with reference both to precedent and
to the commitment to “‘dignity . . . and decency’”64 embodied in the
Amendment itself.65
Estelle was followed by a series of cases involving inmate com-
plaints about, among other things, prison crowding,66 shoddy facili-
ties,67 brutality by correctional officers,68 and environmental tobacco
conditions are “deprivation[s] of . . . single, identifiable human need[s] such as food, warmth, or
exercise.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304.
59. See, e.g., Bukowski, supra note 55, at 420-28.
60. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
61. See id. at 99-101 (reciting the allegations made in the case). Gamble apparently was hit
with a 600 pound bale of cotton, causing a painful back injury. See id. at 99 n.3. Despite the in-
effectiveness of the medical treatments prescribed, Gamble was ordered back to work and was
placed in solitary confinement when, on medical grounds, he refused. See id. at 100. Immedi-
ately prior to bringing suit, he had been suffering blackouts and chest pains, but was not al-
lowed regular access to a doctor. See id. at 101.
62. Id. at 103-04 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
63. See id. at 102-03 (discussing the history of the Amendment).
64. Id. at 102 (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
65. Interestingly, the decision was virtually unanimous, with Justice Blackmun concurring
only in the judgment, see id. at 108 (Blackmun, J., concurring), and only Justice Stevens filing a
dissent—in which he expressed “no serious disagreement” with the majority. See id. (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
66. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
67. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
68. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
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smoke.69 Of these cases, the most important was Wilson v. Seiter,70 a
case brought by Pearly Wilson, an Ohio prisoner who complained of
“overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient locker storage space, in-
adequate heating and cooling, improper ventilation, unclean and in-
adequate restrooms, unsanitary dining facilities and food prepara-
tion, and housing with mentally and physically ill inmates.”71 The
Court held that prisoners suing over the conditions of their confine-
ment can prevail only if they are able to satisfy a two-pronged test.72
The subjective component of the Wilson test requires proof of a cul-
pable mental state.73 The prisoner must be able to show that a prison
officer or employee was “deliberately indifferent,” or worse, to the
inmate’s needs.74 The objective component requires that the inmate
be able to show that the deprivation conflicts with contemporary
standards of decency.75
B. Applying the Wilson Test to Religious Deprivations
The conditions of confinement cases that the Court has heard so
far have primarily involved threats to inmates’ physical health.76 But
the body of doctrine to which these cases have given rise is not so
limited. At least some deprivations of religious liberty appear to sat-
isfy the Wilson test, and thus appear to be forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment. The rest of this Part explores how Eighth Amendment
religious freedom claims might fare under the Wilson line of cases.
1. The Subjective Prong. To satisfy the subjective prong of the
Wilson test, an inmate must show that a member of the prison staff
was deliberately indifferent, or worse, to the prisoner’s needs.77 For
Eighth Amendment claims based on religious deprivations, the war-
den is likely to be the relevant staff member. Determining which re-
69. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993).
70. 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
71. Id. at 296.
72. See id. at 298 (mentioning both the subjective and objective prongs); see also Helling,
509 U.S. at 35-37 (evaluating an inmate’s claim under each of the two prongs).
73. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298-304.
74. Id.
75. Wilson itself focused on the subjective prong, merely noting in passing the existence of
the objective prong. See id. at 298-303. A good exposition of the requirements of the objective
prong can be found in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-47 (1981). See also infra Part
III.B.2 (providing a detailed discussion of the objective component of the Wilson test).
76. See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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ligious activities are permissible is one of his responsibilities.78 Absent
dereliction of duty, then, his decision to allow a particular level of re-
ligious freedom must certainly be a deliberate one. To the extent that
the warden decides not to permit a certain type of religious exercise,
he is manifesting indifference to the plight of those inmates who wish
to engage in the forbidden type of worship.79 To put this point an-
other way: Prison is an institution of total control.80 When a particular
type of religious exercise is prohibited, it is because a prison official
has expressly decided to prohibit it—and therein has manifested de-
liberate indifference to the needs of inmates seeking that type of ex-
ercise.
2. The Objective Prong. The objective prong of the Wilson test
presents a difficult issue: how serious must a harm be before it rises
to a constitutional level? According to the Court, a prisoner must
show that he has been deprived of the “minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities.”81 But this is not a constant standard, because “[n]o
static ‘test’ can exist by which courts determine whether conditions of
confinement are cruel and unusual . . . the Eighth Amendment ‘must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
78. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing federal prison wardens’ power to
limit religious activities).
79. Of course, the warden might have mixed feelings or regrets about his decision, and
thus might be, in some literal sense, not indifferent. But such an exploration of the warden’s
mental state is probably unnecessary. For example, several courts have found Eighth Amend-
ment violations despite wardens’ claims that they were not, in fact, indifferent to prisoners’
needs but rather were constrained by inadequate funding. See, e.g., Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d
769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that poor conditions cannot be excused because of inadequate
funding); Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1039, 1043-44 (5th Cir. 1980) (same). But see Wilson, 501
U.S. at 301-02 (suggesting in dicta that literal deliberate indifference may always be required).
80. In the words of one eloquent federal judge:
[P]rison is a complex of physical arrangements and of measures, all wholly govern-
mental, all wholly performed by agents of government, which determine the total
existence of certain human beings (except perhaps in the realm of the spirit, and in-
evitably there as well) from sundown to sundown, sleeping, waking, speaking, silent,
working, playing, viewing, eating, voiding, reading, alone, with others. . . . State gov-
ernments have not undertaken to require members of the general adult population to
rise at a certain hour, retire at a certain hour, eat at certain hours, live for periods
with no companionship whatever, wear certain clothing, or submit to oral and anal
searches after visiting hours, nor have state governments undertaken to prohibit
members of the general adult population from speaking to one another, wearing
beards, embracing their spouses, or corresponding with their lovers.
Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 550 (W.D. Wis. 1972).
81. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); accord Jihad v. Wright, 929 F. Supp.
325, 331 (N.D. Ind. 1996).
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the progress of a maturing society.’”82 Ultimately, the Court has held,
this focus on contemporary societal standards of decency requires an
inquiry into “the public attitude toward a given sanction.”83
The Court has identified several means of determining public
opinion: history,84 expert opinion,85 and legislative action.86 As will
shortly become clear, the first two are of little use in evaluating the
82. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality
opinion)). Even if a punishment satisfies contemporary standards of decency, it may still be
unconstitutional if it does not comport with human dignity. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“[P]ublic perceptions of standards of decency with respect
to criminal sanctions are not conclusive [because penalties] also must accord with the dignity of
man.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because I conclude that religious deprivations fail
to live up to modern standards of decency, and because the jurisprudence surrounding the
“dignity of man” requirement is both sparse and unclear, I do not discuss the dignity require-
ment of the Eighth Amendment further.
83. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. The great benefit of grounding Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence in public opinion is that it avoids having the subjective views of judges determine the
scope of the Amendment. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275 (1980) (stating that “Eighth
Amendment judgments should neither be nor appear to be merely the subjective views of indi-
vidual Justices”). Still, the focus on the public’s view of a given sanction makes for questionable
doctrine for several reasons. First, allowing constitutional decisions to turn so directly on the
public whim means unstable and unpredictable jurisprudence: must the Court reverse itself
each time sentiment shifts? Second, to the extent that one conceives of the role of the Court as
a countermajoritarian one, it is simply absurd to have the constitutionality of a practice turn on
its popularity. The best piece of evidence in Eighth Amendment cases would then be a current
Gallup Poll. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 361 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(discussing the relevance of polls); id. at 385-86 & n.9 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (actually citing
a poll). Perhaps the liberals on the Court emphasized the role of public sentiment as a means of
striking down the death penalty. The subsequent retrenchment in criminal law revealed the
vulnerability of an Eighth Amendment edifice constructed on the sandy foundations of public
opinion.
84. A fine example of this type of analysis is provided by Justice White, writing for the
plurality, in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-96 (1977) (discussing the criminal laws of the
several states as they relate to the death penalty for rape and as “guidance in history”).
85. See, e.g., Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 n.13. (noting that expert opinions “‘do not establish
the constitutional minima[, but] rather . . . establish goals recommended by the organization in
question’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 543-44 n. 27 (1979))).
86. See, e.g., id. at 346-47 (“[W]hen the question was whether capital punishment for cer-
tain crimes violated contemporary values, the Court looked for ‘objective indicia’ derived [in
part] from . . . the action of state legislatures . . . .”); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174 n.19 (“[L]egislative
measures adopted by the people’s chosen representatives provide one important means of as-
certaining contemporary values . . . .”). The use of legislative action is somewhat paradoxical,
since the Eighth Amendment must have been meant to express a limit to legislative activity.
See Furman, 408 U.S. at 258 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he Clause imposes upon this Court
the duty . . . to determine the constitutional validity of a challenged punishment, whatever that
punishment may be.”). Nonetheless, it is clear that this is the single most important factor in
most Eighth Amendment judgments. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
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cognizability of religious freedom claims under the Eighth Amend-
ment, while the third clearly weighs in favor of allowing such claims.87
The Court’s concern with whether a certain punishment (or
practice) has been historically imposed (or followed) is somewhat
puzzling in light of its focus on evolving and contemporary standards
of decency. But even if it is a relevant factor in some situations, it
should be discounted in this one. America’s religious landscape is
simply changing too rapidly for historical inquiry to carry much
weight. Religious diversity is increasing, especially in prisons, where
ethnic and religious minorities are overrepresented.88 And Ameri-
cans’ religious tolerance is growing as well.89 In any case, the histori-
cal record is equivocal. At one time, religion and religious instruction
were pillars of prison life,90 whereas in more recent years, prison ad-
ministrators have been less friendly towards religion.91
If history is of little use in determining whether religious depri-
vations can satisfy the objective prong of the Wilson test, what about
expert opinion? It, too, is problematic. First, because expert opinion
does not generally depend on public opinion, its logical relevance is
slim. This may explain why the Court has found little occasion to turn
to expert opinion in an effort to determine the contours of the Eighth
Amendment.92 Lower courts have also generally downplayed the im-
87. One additional factor which a court might consider, but which is omitted from the list
here, is whether or not juries frequently impose a given punishment when given the opportu-
nity. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181-82. Although that makes sense as a measure of public opinion
in the sentencing context, it does not in the context of prison conditions. The jury does not con-
trol the conditions of the prison to which they send the defendant.
88. See, e.g., Characteristics of the Federal Prison Population, 1998 (visited Feb. 19, 1999)
<http://www.dev.infoplease.com/ipa/A0193950.html> (noting that 40.3% of federal prisoners
are black, and that 28.3% are hispanic); Mack v. O’Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1177 (7th Cir. 1996)
(noting that there are “more than 300 religious denominations” at one Illinois prison alone); cf.
BECKFORD & GILLIAT, supra note 29, at 2, 25-55 (noting that in English prisons, “a growing
number of prisoners . . . are declaring themselves to be, for example, Buddhists, Hindus, Mus-
lims, or Sikhs”).
89. See Review: America’s Middle Class: Moral but Not Moralising, ECONOMIST, April 18,
1998, at 8, 8 (noting signs of increased tolerance, such as the fact that “evangelical Protestants
have ceased to call adherents of other faiths ‘infidels,’” and concluding that “Americans have
managed a rare thing: they are both religious and tolerant”).
90. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
92. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 n.13 (1981) (noting that expert opinion is of
slight import in making Eighth Amendment determinations).
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portance of expert opinion.93 Moreover, expert opinion on inmates’
free exercise is mixed. Correctional professionals tend to be suspi-
cious of religious activity,94 while most religious leaders and many
policymakers support broader protection for prisoners’ religious lib-
erty.95
Unlike the inquiries into history and expert opinion, the inquiry
into legislative action does shed light on the cognizability of religious
freedom claims under the Eighth Amendment. This alone would jus-
tify a detailed examination of recent legislative events. But there is
another reason to conduct such a review—legislative action is the
most important factor in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In the
words of Justice Powell, “the first indicator of the public’s attitude
[and thus of contemporary standards of decency] must always be
found in the legislative judgments of the people’s chosen representa-
tives.”96
In the most common type of Eighth Amendment case, a court
examines a condition or punishment that has been approved by the
legislature. In such a situation, the Supreme Court recommends re-
straint. After all, judges are not democratically elected and so may be
less likely than legislators to serve as a “‘good reflex of a democratic
society.’”97 Consequently, a heavy burden normally rests on a plaintiff
who brings an Eighth Amendment challenge.98
Ultimately, this makes sense, partly “because the constitutional
test is intertwined with an assessment of contemporary standards and
the legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such stan-
93. See, e.g., Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[Expert] opinions will
not ordinarily establish constitutional minima. . . . [T]hey weigh less heavily . . . than what the
general public would consider decent.”).
94. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., infra notes 105-09, 113-14 (discussing the Senate’s rejection of an amendment
which would have exempted prisons from RFRA).
96. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 436 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). In the Gregg
opinion, analysis of the legislatures’ positions is given pride of place in the Eighth Amendment
analysis. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 162-68, 174-76, 179-81, 232 (1976) (opinions of
various Justices). It also takes up the greatest amount of space in that opinion, in Furman, and
in other important Eighth Amendment cases. See id.; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 296-
300, 336-42, 383-86, 412-13, 417-18, 431-33, 464-65 (1972) (opinions of various Justices); Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (“The infliction of such unnecessary suffering is inconsistent
with contemporary standards of decency as manifested in modern legislation.” (emphasis
added)).
97. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
98. See id.
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dards. ‘In a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted
to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the peo-
ple.’”99
Eighth Amendment challenges to deprivations of religious free-
dom are, however, anomalous in this respect. Although the religious
freedoms of inmates are poorly protected,100 this state of affairs exists
despite, rather than because of, the actions of the national legisla-
ture.101 Congress attempted to fortify religious exercise in the prisons
through RFRA102 but was rebuffed by the Court.103
Indeed, both the Senate and House reports on RFRA explicitly
criticized O’Lone, the case in which the Court first applied the
“rational relation to legitimate penological interests” test in the con-
text of religious freedom.104 During RFRA’s pendency, all fifty state
prison directors signed a letter asking Congress not to require strict
scrutiny in the prison context.105 This letter led to the proposal of an
amendment, the Reid Amendment,106 to exempt prisons from
RFRA’s purview.107 After substantial debate,108 the Amendment was
99. Id. (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 383 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
100. See supra Part II.
101. Although the Court has most often discussed the role of state legislatures, this is only
because most criminal sanctions are determined at the state level. It is clear that the actions of
the national legislature are also relevant. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 180 (discussing Congress’s ac-
tions). For present purposes, the actions of the national legislature are more illuminating than
those of the state legislatures, because Congress has spoken with a clear voice on the issue of
religious freedom in prisons, see infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text, while the states are
still struggling with the issue, see supra note 32.
102. See Daniel J. Solove, Note, Faith Profaned: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
and Religion in the Prisons, 106 YALE L.J. 459, 470-73 (1996) (providing an excellent discussion
of RFRA’s legislative history).
103. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct 2157, 2172 (1997) (finding RFRA unconstitu-
tional).
104. See S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 9-11 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898-
1901; H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 7-8 (1993); see generally supra notes 42-45 and accompanying
text (discussing O’Lone).
105. See 139 CONG. REC. S14,355 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (reprinting the letter). The fear
appeared to be twofold: first, that a higher level of protection for religion would cause more
prisoner free exercise suits, and second, that more such suits would succeed, requiring expen-
sive accommodations. See id.
106. The Amendment was named after a primary sponsor, Senator Harry Reid.
107. On January 28, 1997, Senator Reid introduced a bill which again sought to exempt
prisoners from the protections of RFRA. See S. 206, 105th Cong. (1997). Since RFRA was
struck down by the Court just months later, the Senate never voted on the bill.
108. The debate over the Reid Amendment was slated to last two-and-one-half hours, sig-
nificantly longer than the debate over RFRA itself. See 139 CONG. REC. S12,463 (daily ed.
Sept. 23, 1993) (statement of Sen. Wellstone) (setting the duration of the debate). The bulk of
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rejected,109 and RFRA was passed—and signed into law—fully appli-
cable to the nation’s prisons.
There is a conceptual asymmetry here. A sanction that has been
conscientiously considered and embraced by a legislature will almost
always be held to be consistent with the Eighth Amendment.110 Leg-
islative disapproval of a given sanction, on the other hand, does not
necessarily imply that the punishment is inconsistent with the Eighth
Amendment’s requirements. Why? Because the legislature may
merely be opining that a given punishment is bad policy, not that it
fails to live up to contemporary standards of decency. For example, if
a state legislature were to decide that supervised release was too
risky to impose, that could hardly count as evidence that supervised
release is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency.
But RFRA was not a mere administrative judgment.111 The leg-
islative history of RFRA indicates that Congress felt that religious
the debate actually occurred on October 26, 1993. See 139 CONG. REC. S14,350–68 (daily ed.
Oct. 26, 1993).
One of the issues discussed at length in the debate was whether or not religious prison-
ers should be given food that comports with their religious dietary requirements. Senator Reid
himself appeared to believe that religious prisoners were routinely granted dietary accommo-
dations by prison wardens. See 139 CONG. REC. S14,354 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993). However,
even in the most progressive jurisdictions, accommodation is hit-or-miss, see, e.g., Ben-
Avraham v. Moses, No. 92-35604, 1993 WL 269611, at *1-3 (9th Cir. July 19, 1993) (rejecting a
Jewish inmate’s request for a kosher diet), and even then may be due to judicial intervention,
see generally Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 1997) (granting a Jewish in-
mate’s request for a kosher diet on First Amendment grounds). Ironically, a co-sponsor of the
Amendment, Wyoming’s Alan Simpson, thought that RFRA would, unhappily, bring about just
such accommodations as Senator Reid already believed to exist: “Prisoners could demand
things such as specially prepared food; the right to pray three times a day . . . .” 139 CONG.
REC. S14,358 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993).
109. The vote was 58 to 41 (with one abstention). See 139 CONG. REC. S14,468 (daily ed.
Oct. 27, 1993).
110. The death penalty cases are evidence of this. The Court held the death penalty uncon-
stitutional in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). But when 35 states immediately passed
new capital punishment statutes in an effort to save the death penalty, the Court was forced to
reverse its position. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-81 (1976) (plurality opinion).
111. Another implausible argument would run as follows: Suppose that RFRA was not
Congress’s way of expressing its opinion about the decency of religious deprivations in prisons.
Suppose, rather, that it was merely expressing its collective academic opinion about the correct
interpretation of the First Amendment. In such a case, no Eighth Amendment consequences
would follow from RFRA’s passage.
There is some support for this argument. A few of RFRA’s sponsors used the language
of constitutional law in arguing for the bill. Senator Hatch, for example, claimed that “[t]he
Smith case was wrongly decided,”
 
and bemoaned the passing of “the compelling interest stan-
dard.” 139 CONG. REC. S14,353 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993). On the connection between Smith
and RFRA, see supra note 29.
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freedom was more a matter of principle than of policy.112 For exam-
ple, conservative Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah proclaimed that re-
jecting the Reid Amendment was simply “the right thing to do,”113 in-
dependent of the rehabilitative benefits of religion.114
While RFRA did not survive Supreme Court review, its passage
was not meaningless. It still stands as evidence of legislative concern
for religious prisoners, and consequently strongly supports the cogni-
zability of Eighth Amendment religious freedom claims.
A recent development reinforces this point. The Religious Lib-
erty Protection Act of 1998 (RLPA) has just been introduced in both
houses of Congress.115 The bill, clearly meant to reach as far as the
Supreme Court will allow, provides exactly the same level of protec-
tion to religion as RFRA did—strict scrutiny for all actions which
substantially burden free exercise.116 The difference between RFRA
and RLPA is that RLPA is grounded in the Commerce Clause,
rather than in the Fourteenth Amendment, and so only affects relig-
ious exercise that has some link to interstate commerce.117
But statements like this were the exception, not the rule. Most Senators appeared clear
on the distinction between the statutory right they were creating and the constitutional rights
defined by the Court. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. S14,350–51 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement
of Sen. Kennedy) (delineating the difference between the two). The decision to pass RFRA
was not a matter of constitutional law. This was even more true of the Reid Amendment. In
debates about the Amendment, there was no talk of the intricacies of constitutional interpreta-
tion; rather, several legislators noted that the tide of public opinion flowed strongly against the
Amendment. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. S14,362 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (discussing opposition to the Amendment). This assessment of public opinion directly
supports the idea that religious deprivations contravene modern standards of decency.
112. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. S14,462 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Lieber-
man) (arguing that it is “dramatic” and improper to permit prisoners’ free exercise to be re-
stricted more easily than that of other citizens). Of course, it was also clearly a policy matter.
As Senator Kennedy proclaimed: “We would encourage prisoners to be religious. There is
every reason to believe that doing so will increase the likelihood that a prisoner will be reha-
bilitat[ed].” 139 CONG. REC. S14,351 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993).
113. 139 CONG. REC. S14,362 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993).
114. With which he was impressed. See id.; cf. supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text
(discussing religion and rehabilitation).
115. See H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 2148, 105th Cong. (1998).
116. See H.R. 4019 § 2(a)-(b); S. 2148 § 2(a)-(b).
117. See H.R. 4019 § 2(a); S. 2148 § 2(a). This provision is controversial and may not sur-
vive, throwing the entire future of RLPA into question. See House Subcommittee Upholds
Principles of Federalism (visited Aug. 29, 1998) <http://www.hslda.org/media/releases/docs/08-
07-98.html> (media release) (noting that the reference to the Commerce Clause has been cut
from the House version of RLPA, but that it may be reinstated).
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Prisons are not exempted from RLPA;118 in light of the history of
RFRA, including the defeat of the Reid Amendment, this surely in-
dicates Congress’s continuing desire to protect prisoners’ free exer-
cise. But because both the future and the scope of RLPA are uncer-
tain, it would be unwise to rely upon it to protect prisoners’ religious
rights.119
A final factor the Court has identified as relevant in assessing
conditions of confinement claims is that prison is an environment of
total control.120 Unlike the inquiries into history and legislative action,
recognizing that prisons are institutions of total control does not re-
veal public opinion and is not probative of contemporary standards
of decency. Nonetheless, the Court has found it important that in-
mates are utterly dependent on guards and administrators for a num-
ber of essential items, services, and activities; because prisoners have
no access to these things other than through their keepers, prison
administrators should not casually close off inmates’ access. For ex-
ample, as the Court observed, “[a]n inmate must rely on prison
authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so,
those needs will not be met.”121
Religious exercise is one of the essential activities that prison
authorities may cut off. The Code of Federal Regulations permits “the
Warden [to] limit attendance at or discontinue a religious activity”122
on a variety of grounds.123 This situation is not unique to federal pris-
ons; states also typically empower prison wardens to restrict inmates’
religious freedom.124
118. The only mention of prisons or inmates is in section 4(c) of the bill, which notes merely
that prisoner suits are subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See H.R. 4019 § 4(c); S.
2148 § 4(c). Advocates of increased religious freedom in prisons are behind the bill. See, e.g.,
Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 4019 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitu-
tion of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Pat Nolan, Presi-
dent, Justice Fellowship), available in 1998 WL 12762197.
119. See supra note 117 (discussing RLPA’s possible emasculation by amendment).
120. See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1993) (stating that “‘when the State
by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him
unable to care for himself’” it must provide for his basic human needs (quoting DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989))).
121. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
122. 28 C.F.R. § 548.10(b) (1997).
123. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (discussing the many grounds on which
religious exercise of federal prisoners may be limited).
124. See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 610 (McKinney 1997) (stating that prisoners’ free ex-
ercise of religion must be “consistent with the proper discipline and management of the institu-
tion”); supra note 32 (discussing California’s system).
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Some might argue that restricting religious programs does not
equate with limiting religious freedom. But merely being able to pray
at night in one’s cell is not adequate religious exercise. Group wor-
ship is an essential part of most religions,125 while others require wor-
ship at particular times126 or places,127 or involve other commands or
prohibitions with which prisoners cannot conform absent some action
by the prison administrators.128 The situation is analogous to the pro-
vision of medical care; adequate medical care and adequate spiritual
care both depend on the sponsorship of prison officials. Thus, the fact
that prison is an institution of total control weighs in favor of allow-
ing Eighth Amendment religious freedom claims.
In short, extant Eighth Amendment doctrine strongly suggests
that some limitations on inmates’ religious freedom would violate the
Amendment. RFRA and RLPA are legislative actions which embody
America’s evolving standards of decency. They show that it is no
longer thought acceptable to deprive inmates of important avenues of
spiritual exercise—at least without a demanding inquiry into the rea-
sons for such restrictions. The validity of this argument is bolstered
by a recognition that prison is an environment of total control, in
which inmates are wholly dependent on prison staff for meaningful
religious exercise.
125. See Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 930 (6th Cir. 1985) (“Most religious faiths give a
central role to congregate religious services. It is an important aspect of religious socialization,
and it imparts a sense of religious fellowship which deepens religious conviction.”). For exam-
ple, Rastafarians engage in Issembly, or religious conversation, as an essential part of their re-
ligious practice. See Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 573 (2d Cir. 1990). Catholics, of
course, attend Mass, the very name of which suggests a group activity. Ethnologically, a major
reason for religious participation is a desire to connect with others—a desire that is especially
strong in the isolating world of prison. See DAMMER, supra note 16, at 159-65.
126. For example, Muslims pray facing east five times per day; all the major religions have
some special holy days. See JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAM: THE STRAIGHT PATH 90 (1988).
127. Native Americans’ religious ceremonies often take place in sweat lodges, for example.
See Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1548 (8th Cir. 1996) (discussing the content of sweat
lodge ceremonies and relating testimony respecting the religious importance of such ceremo-
nies).
128. For example, many religions (including, among others, Islam, Judaism, Rastafarian-
ism, some sects of Buddhism, and Jainism) require adherents to adopt certain dietary practices.
See, e.g., Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674, 675 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing Jewish die-
tary strictures); Abdul-Malik v. Goord, No. 96 CIV. 1021 (DLC), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2047,
at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (discussing Muslim dietary laws). Absent the cooperation of
prison officials, it would be virtually impossible for strict adherents to these diets to receive
adequate nutrition. Consequently, this form of religious exercise is utterly dependent on the
whims of the wardens.
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IV. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
A. Religious Freedom and (Physical?) Pain
One objection that could be advanced against the preceding ar-
gument can be summarized as follows: An Eighth Amendment viola-
tion requires a showing of pain. Religious deprivations are not really
‘painful,’ and so cannot be actionable.
A related argument would be that the Prisoner Litigation Re-
form Act (PLRA)129 forbids inmates from bringing suits in which only
psychological injuries are alleged. These two connected positions will
be considered in turn.
1. Pain and the Eighth Amendment. While at least one court has
rejected an Eighth Amendment religious freedom claim because the
inmate plaintiffs failed to show an infliction of pain,130 this view is de-
ficient for several reasons. First, a deprivation of religious freedom
can be said to be psychologically painful,131 and psychological harms
are almost certainly actionable under the Eighth Amendment. Justice
Blackmun wrote:
It is not hard to imagine inflictions of psychological harm . . . that
might prove to be cruel and unusual punishment . . . . “Pain” in its
ordinary meaning surely includes a notion of psychological harm. I
am unaware of any precedent of this Court to the effect that psy-
chological pain is not cognizable for constitutional purposes. If any-
thing, our precedent is to the contrary.132
Various lower courts have come to the same conclusion. For ex-
ample, in Frazier v. Ward,133 a case involving visual rectal inspections
of New York prisoners, the court found that when highly invasive
129. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3626,
28 U.S.C. § 1915, 28 U.S.C. § 1346, 42 U.S.C. § 1997, and other scattered sections (1998)).
130. See Lucero v. Hensley, 920 F. Supp. 1067, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that because
Native Americans deprived of religious artifacts and denied a chaplain “do not allege any in-
fliction of pain” they could not state a claim).
131. See supra Introduction, Part I (describing the psychological importance of religion to
some prisoners).
132. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 16 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Julie
M. Riewe, Note, The Least Among Us: Unconstitutional Changes in Prisoner Litigation Under
the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 47 DUKE L.J. 117, 152-54 (1997) (discussing psycho-
logical pain and the Eighth Amendment).
133. 426 F. Supp. 1354 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
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searches were not grounded in any appropriate security concern, they
were “dehumanizing”134 and violative of the Eighth Amendment.135
Even if psychological harm were not actionable under the Eighth
Amendment, however, some prisoners deprived of religious liberty
would still be able to state causes of action. In some cases, a denial of
religious freedom leads, directly if not immediately, to a physically
painful result. This class of “derived” Eighth Amendment claims is
well illustrated by Jolly v. Coughlin.136 The case centered around the
New York prison system’s requirement that all inmates be tested an-
nually for latent tuberculosis.137 The TB test involved the injection of
a purified protein derivative under the skin.138 Plaintiff Jolly, a Rasta-
farian, refused to take the test on the grounds that his religion pro-
hibited accepting artificial substances into the body.139 As a conse-
quence, Jolly was placed in “medical keeplock,” a form of
administrative confinement that allowed the inmate to leave his cell
for only ten minutes each week (for a shower).140 Despite its name,
medical keeplock had no medical significance; it did not involve res-
piratory isolation.141 Indeed, had Jolly tested positive for latent tuber-
culosis, he would still not have been respiratorily isolated from the
rest of the prison (unlike those with active TB).142 As a consequence
of his three-and-a-half years in keeplock, Jolly alleged that he suf-
134. Id. at 1366. This conclusion certainly appeared warranted by the evidence. One inmate
who had been subjected to the searches described them as follows:
[J]ust about every time I came out [of the cell block where he was housed (the in-
mate was naked at this point)] it was always anywhere from six to eight, and there
has been occasions where there was approximately 12 officers . . And one particular
officer directs you to lift your arms to examine your arm pits. He asks you to open
your mouth, wag your tongue, run your fingers through your hair, lift your testicles,
skin back your penis, then you are directed to turn around, lift your feet, left and
right foot, and bend over, and that’s the most humiliating part of the whole proce-
dure in the sense there would be a lot of oohs and aahs and good show . . . .
Id. at 1363 (ellipses in original).
135. See id. at 1366; see also Show v. Patterson, 955 F. Supp. 182, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(concluding that psychological pain may constitute an Eighth Amendment violation under cer-
tain circumstances); Jones v. Banks, 892 F. Supp. 988, 990 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (stating that a “brutal
and demeaning attack” on an inmate’s psyche would be actionable).
136. 76 F.3d 468 (2d Cir. 1996).
137. See id. at 471-72.
138. See id. at 471.
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fered from “headaches, hair loss, rashes, and an inability to stand or
walk without difficulty.”143
Jolly’s inability to get any meaningful exercise, and the health
harms he suffered as a result, were the basis for the Second Circuit’s
determination that the Eighth Amendment was probably violated.144
The crucial point for present purposes is that Jolly’s religious liberties
had not been curtailed directly, because he had not been forced to
undergo the test. The court concluded, however, that the Eighth
Amendment was implicated because he had been placed “in the posi-
tion of choosing to follow his religious beliefs or to improve his con-
ditions of confinement.”145 This sort of case,146 where a prisoner can
comply with the tenets of his religion only by undergoing significant
physical deprivation,147 shows that attempts to curtail religious liberty
may result in physical harms.148
Jordan v. Gardner149 is another case involving a physical harm re-
sulting from a psychological one. There, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
male guards could not perform extensive clothed body searches on
female inmates.150 The court wrote that “[o]ne [inmate], who had a
143. Id.
144. See id. at 480-81. The court was evaluating a preliminary injunction issued by a district
court, and so was attempting to decide if the plaintiff had shown “a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits” of his claim. Id. at 480.
145. Id. at 481.
146. For other examples of this kind of claim, see Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986 (2d Cir.
1986) (involving the hygiene problems of religious prisoners who alleged that they were not
afforded pork-free soap) and Jihad v. Wright, 929 F. Supp. 325, 330-31 (N.D. Ind. 1996)
(following Jolly on similar facts).
147. A choice the Second Circuit termed “not meaningful, much less constitutional.” Jolly,
76 F.3d at 481.
148. One of the most interesting subtypes of derived Eighth Amendment claim involves
adherents to religions that require specific dietary practices. It is at least imaginable that a pris-
oner could refuse food because it was unacceptable to her on religious grounds, and sue for re-
lief on the theory that she was, effectively, being starved by the prison. Cf. Burns v. Long, Nos.
92-7602, 92-7063, 1994 WL 709329, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1994) (rejecting a malnourishment
claim on factual grounds, but implicitly accepting the legal claim that it would be actionable if
proven); Chapman v. Pickett, 491 F. Supp. 967, 972 (C.D. Ill. 1980) (finding a First Amendment
violation where a prison did not accommodate a Muslim inmate’s request not to handle pork).
149. 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993)
150. See id. at 1530-31. These searches were described by the court as follows:
During the cross-gender clothed body search, the male guard stands next to the fe-
male inmate and thoroughly runs his hands over her clothed body starting with her
neck and working down to her feet. According to the prison training material, a
guard is to “[u]se a flat hand and pushing motion across the [inmate’s] crotch area.”
The guard must “[p]ush inward and upward when searching the crotch and upper
thighs of the inmate.” All seams in the leg and the crotch area are to be “squeez[ed]
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long history of sexual abuse by men, unwillingly submitted to a cross-
gender clothed body search and suffered severe distress: she had to
have her fingers pried loose from bars she had grabbed during the
search, and she vomited after returning to her cell block.”151
While not every inmate who suffers a psychological harm will be
able to point to a physical manifestation of the injury, Jolly and Jor-
dan make clear that for some inmates, even a restrictive interpreta-
tion of the word “pain” will not preclude Eighth Amendment claims.
2. The Prison Litigation Reform Act. Even if psychological and
emotional injuries are cognizable under the Eighth Amendment, it
might be argued that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) pro-
hibits inmates from bringing claims based only on such injuries. The
PLRA provides, in part, that “[n]o Federal civil action may be
brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional
facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury.”152 Because religious dep-
rivations often will not produce physical injuries,153 it might be
thought that the PLRA prevents litigation to protect religious free-
dom.
This provision of the PLRA may not be constitutional, because it
may impermissibly limit the courts’ ability to fashion remedies for
constitutional violations,154 and may violate the Equal Protection
Clause by singling out prisoners as the only group whose access to the
courts is to be limited.155 Fortunately, for present purposes it is not
necessary to resolve the complex constitutional debate, because the
physical injury provision of the PLRA has been largely eviscerated
and knead[ed].” Using the back of the hand, the guard also is to search the breast
area in a sweeping motion, so that the breasts will be “flattened.”
Id. at 1523 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
151. Id.
152. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(e) (West 1998 Supp.).
153. There may, of course, be physical manifestations of emotional injuries, such as head-
aches, weight loss, and so forth. See Riewe, supra note 132, at 154; supra notes 136-51 and ac-
companying text. But not every psychologically damaged person will necessarily suffer atten-
dant physical problems. And at least one court seems to have rejected the use of such maladies
as qualifying physical injuries. See Cain v. Virginia, 982 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(holding, apparently, that allegations of severe headaches and stomach cramps were not serious
enough to satisfy the PLRA).
154. See Riewe, supra note 132, at 153-54.
155. See Dorn v. DeTella, No. 96 C 3830, 1997 WL 85145, at *4-6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 1997)
(suggesting strongly that the PLRA is unconstitutional on Equal Protection grounds). But see
Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459, 461-64 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding the constitutionality of the
physical injury requirement against various challenges).
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by the courts. Some judges have flatly and openly ignored the provi-
sion,156 while others have exempted constitutional claims.157 Still oth-
ers have stated that the provision bars only suits for damages, not re-
quests for injunctive relief.158 And, of course, the PLRA applies only
to suits in federal courts. Inmates are free to pursue their religious
freedom claims in state courts, unfettered by the Act.159 The conclu-
sion that the PLRA does not bar effective litigation of religious free-
dom issues is ineluctable.
B. Isn’t the First Amendment the Right Way to Protect Free Exercise?
A second argument against extending Eighth Amendment pro-
tection to religious freedom is best expressed as a question: given that
the First Amendment provides explicit constitutional protection to
freedom of religion, how can the Eighth Amendment, which doesn’t
even mention religion, provide more extensive protection?160 Several
courts have rejected Eighth Amendment free exercise claims on this
basis.161
But consider the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It forbids some limitations of First Amendment values
that would be permitted by the First Amendment itself.162 For exam-
ple, while the First Amendment permits regulation of obscene
156. See, e.g., Warburton v. Underwood, 2 F. Supp. 2d 306, 315 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (ignoring
the provision in a religious freedom case).
157. See, e.g., Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating, in a First
Amendment case, that “[t]he deprivation of First Amendment rights entitles a plaintiff to judi-
cial relief wholly aside from any physical injury he can show, or any mental or emotional injury
he may have incurred” and holding that “[t]herefore, § 1997e(e) does not apply to First
Amendment Claims regardless of the form of relief sought”); Barnes v. Ramos, No. 94 C 7541,
1996 WL 599637, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 1996) (advancing a similar argument as to constitu-
tional violations in general).
158. See Zehner, 133 F.3d at 462-63.
159. State courts must adjudicate claims brought before them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 2-4 (1980).
160. The argument implied by this question is a variant on the canon of statutory construc-
tion which holds that a more specific provision governs a more general one, from the maxim
that “[g]eneralis clausula ad ea qua antea specialiter sunt comprehensa.” See BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 684 (6th ed. 1990) (defining this maxim as “[a] general clause does not extend to
those things which are previously provided for specially”).
161. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 601 n.16 (7th Cir. 1986). The same error ap-
pears to have been made in Smith v. Coughlin, 748 F.2d 783, 787-89 (2d Cir. 1984) (rejecting an
inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim without mentioning limitations on the inmate’s religious
freedom, but analyzing those limitations explicitly under the rubric of the First Amendment).
162. The First Amendment overlaps with many other constitutional provisions. See Em-
ployment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990) (listing cases involving such an overlap).
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speech, a regulation which prohibited women, but not men, from ut-
tering obscenities would likely be held unconstitutional on Equal
Protection grounds.163 This result follows from the purpose of the
Equal Protection Clause. It is intended to prevent discrimination,
which may, of course, occur in areas also regulated by other constitu-
tional provisions.
Similarly, the Eighth Amendment targets a particular evil—
inhumane punishment—which crosscuts many constitutional values.
Both the primary opinion and the concurrence in Jordan—the Ninth
Circuit’s recent decision about cross-gender clothed body searches—
discussed at length whether the Eighth or the Fourth Amendment
provided the proper basis for the decision.164 The authors of the pri-
mary opinion were confident that the Eighth Amendment was vio-
lated, but unsure if the Fourth Amendment extended so far,165 while
the concurring judge concluded that both Amendments were vio-
lated.166 If the Eight Amendment can overlap with, and extend be-
yond, the Fourth Amendment, it may surely interact in the same way
with the First.167
CONCLUSION
In determining the contours of the Eighth Amendment, the Su-
preme Court pays close attention to legislative behavior. Therefore,
the passage of RFRA and the pendency of RLPA strongly suggest
that the Eighth Amendment should be held to prohibit certain re-
strictions on inmates’ religious exercise. This does not imply, of
163. Cf. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (holding that a Buddhist inmate who alleged
that “he was denied a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportu-
nity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts” had stated a vi-
able equal protection claim).
164. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1524-25 (9th Cir. 1993); see id. at 1532, 1540-43
(Reinhardt, J., concurring). This conclusion may only apply to searches of women by male
guards. See id. at 1526 (discussing Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985), which
upheld pat searches of male inmates by female guards).
165. See id. at 1524-25 (stating the conclusions of the primary opinion).
166. See id. at 1532 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (“I believe that the conduct challenged here
violates the fourth amendment as well as the eighth . . . .”); id. at 1540-43 (Reinhardt, J., con-
curring).
167. The overlap between the First and Eighth Amendments may have a special constitu-
tional significance. In Smith, Justice Scalia noted that in cases where the plaintiffs were assert-
ing multiple constitutional claims, exceptions to generally applicable, neutral laws might be ap-
propriate. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. No cases explore this idea in the prison setting, where
Turner and O’Lone, not Smith, are the relevant First Amendment precedents. See supra notes
36-53 and accompanying text (discussing Turner and O’Lone).
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course, that prisoners’ religious freedoms should be limitless. At its
outer bound, the argument outlined in this Note only implies that
contemporary standards of decency—as embodied in recent legisla-
tive actions—require the invalidation of those prison regulations that
cannot survive strict scrutiny. After all, strict scrutiny is what the leg-
islature sought to impose. Some regulations, solidly grounded in se-
curity or other concerns, should survive, as they did during the win-
dow of time when RFRA was in effect.168
As a practical matter, all current prison regulations may survive,
because the argument I have proposed may not meet with success in
the courts. It is difficult to estimate the argument’s likelihood of suc-
cess, in part because it has likely never been properly presented to
any court. While religious prisoners do occasionally bring Eighth
Amendment claims against prison officials who limit religious exer-
cise, these prisoners are virtually always proceeding pro se,169 and may
not completely conceptualize, or successfully present, the argument
outlined above. Further, these inmates invariably, and understanda-
bly, make First Amendment arguments as well. As a result, courts
have frequently fallen into the errors discussed in Part IV and held
that Eighth Amendment claims must include allegations of physical
pain, or that free exercise claims must be brought under the First
Amendment.
The simple fact that so many cases have rejected ill-conceived or
ill-executed Eighth Amendment challenges to religious restrictions is
itself a problem for future litigants who would use the Eighth
Amendment to protect the religious freedom of the incarcerated. The
appearance of thoughtful precedent may obscure the sandy founda-
tions of most of the current cases in this area.
Of course, there are a few courts that have concluded that the
Eighth Amendment does offer some protection to religious in-
mates.170 But even these courts have never found the Eighth Amend-
ment to protect a religious freedom that the First Amendment does
168. See, e.g., Winburn v. Bologna, 979 F. Supp. 531, 535 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (rejecting
RFRA challenge to prison regulation forbidding the receipt of racist literature); Jenkins v. An-
gelone, 948 F. Supp. 543, 548 (E.D. Va. 1996) (rejecting a RFRA challenge to a prison policy of
not providing an extremely strict vegetarian diet).
169. A few examples of such pro se suits and the resulting opinions are: Show v. Patterson,
955 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Lucero v. Hensely, 920 F. Supp. 1067 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Jihad
v. Wright, 929 F. Supp. 325 (N.D. Ind. 1996).
170. See, e.g., Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 480-83 (2d Cir. 1996); Jihad, 929 F. Supp. at
331-32.
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not. Until this hurdle is passed, the Eighth Amendment will not be
doing the work that this Note suggests it should.
Arguing that the Eighth Amendment should be held to protect
the religious liberties of prisoners is an uphill battle.171 The lower
court cases in this area are mostly unfavorable, and convicts, even
devout ones, do not make sympathetic litigants. Nonetheless, it is a
battle worth fighting. The words of President Lincoln, spoken in an-
other context, are apposite:
In giving freedom to the slave, we assure freedom to the free—
honorable alike in what we give and what we preserve.172
171. If the issue were aggressively litigated, it is at least imaginable that the Supreme Court
would want to speak to it, given the doctrinal confusion in this small area. Justices Thomas and
Scalia, who believe that the Eighth Amendment should not apply in conditions of confinement
cases at all, would surely vote against interpreting the Eighth Amendment in this way. See su-
pra note 54 (noting the views of those Justices). No one else’s vote is certain. Even the rela-
tively conservative Chief Justice has parted ways with Justices Thomas and Scalia in recent
Eighth Amendment cases. Compare Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 26 (1993) (majority
opinion in which Rehnquist, C.J., joined), and Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 3 (1992)
(majority opinion in which Rehnquist, C.J., joined), with Helling, 509 U.S. at 37 (Thomas, J.,
joined by Scalia, J., dissenting), and Hudson, 503 U.S. at 17 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J.,
dissenting). The rest of the current Court has similarly been prone to read the Amendment ex-
pansively with respect to conditions of confinement. See supra notes 58-75 and accompanying
text (discussing modern Eighth Amendment doctrine). Perhaps the most perspicacious view is
that “in a given case, any result is possible.” Interview with H. Jefferson Powell, Professor of
Law, Duke University, Durham, N.C. (Oct. 2, 1997).
172. Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862), in LINCOLN: HIS
WORDS AND HIS WORLD 57 (Country Beautiful Found. Inc. ed., 1965).
